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Abstract
The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued
repeated games. The famous ‘Blackwell’s approachability theorem’ prescribes a strategy for ap-
proachability, i.e., for ‘steering’ the average vector cost of a given agent towards a given target set,
irrespective of the strategies of the other agents. In this paper, motivated by the multi-objective
optimization/decision making problems in dynamically changing environments, we address the ap-
proachability problem in Stackelberg stochastic games with vector-valued cost functions. We make
two main contributions. Firstly, we give a simple and computationally tractable strategy for ap-
proachability for Stackelberg stochastic games along the lines of Blackwell’s. Secondly, we give a
reinforcement learning algorithm for learning the approachable strategy when the transition kernel
is unknown. We also recover as a by-product Blackwell’s necessary and sufficient conditions for ap-
proachability for convex sets in this set up and thus a complete characterization. We give sufficient
conditions for non-convex sets.
1 Introduction
Classical game theory, Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and stochastic games typically deal only
with scalar performance criteria: corresponding to each state and action of the agents, each agent
incurs a scalar cost. The standard problem is to compute or learn a policy for each agent which
will minimize her scalar performance objective conditioned on the policies of all other agents and
the dynamics of the underlying system. Computing or learning equilibrium policies in a standard
normal form strategic game or stochastic game, computing or learning the optimal policy of average
or discounted cost MDPs, are the typical examples. However, many interesting problems often fall
outside this ‘scalar performance criteria’ class. For example, consider the problem faced by automobile
manufacturers. They want to minimize their cost but also worry about reliability, perceived quality
and customer satisfaction - all of which are quantified in some way and are required to be greater
than some prescribed values. Bandwidth allocation in a wireless network is another instance which
involves throughput maximization while also providing certain delay guarantees.
Multi-objective optimization is a well studied area [2] though most methods focus on achieving a
Pareto-optimal solution. In the context of decision making under dynamically changing environment,
these problems have been studied extensively under the rubric ‘constrained MDPs’ [3]. A reinforcement
learning algorithm for constrained MDPs was developed in [4]. Articles [5] and [6] consider MDPs
with arbitrary reward process. Their setting is in the framework of regret minimization which is
different from our approach. Approachability for repeated games has been analyzed extensively in the
literature; we refer the reader to the survey paper [7] and the references therein.
Approachability in a stochastic game framework has also been addressed before. Article [8] ad-
dressed this problem where the approachability from a given initial state was studied under some
recurrence assumptions for countable state space controlled Markov chains. Their scheme depends on
updating strategies when the system returns to a fixed state s0. This scheme was proposed because
there appeared to be a need to keep the policy fixed for some duration in order to ‘exploit’ that policy
before one ‘explores’ again. However, there are many computational difficulties associated with this
approach, in particular slow speed if the returns to the prescribed fixed state are infrequent, a com-
mon situation in large problems. Furthermore, this approach has the undesirable effect of increasing
the variance of the cost for the agents if the recurrence times are large, again a typical scenario in
very large systems. For this reason, the scheme will have slow convergence and high fluctuations.
In [9], an alternative scheme is proposed that requires less restrictive assumptions. The basic idea
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is the ‘increasing time window’ method: keep the policy constant for a length of a time window
whose duration increases gradually. In each window, the policy used is the equilibrium policy of an
Ni-stage stochastic game where Ni is the length of the ith window. The computation of this policy
is thus clearly non-trivial. In turn, [10] presents yet another scheme which has similar drawbacks.
These schemes also do not address another important aspect of this problem: a learning algorithm
for approachability when the transition kernel corresponding to the underlying Markov dynamics is
unknown. In [11], one does have a learning algorithm that builds on the work in [8]. The key idea
is to run J learning algorithms in parallel, each one corresponds to a different steering direction.
If J is sufficiently large, ǫ-approachability can be guaranteed. This scheme, however, is potentially
computationally impractical in some scenarios.
The key difference in the present work is our adaptation of the Stackelberg framework which, by
setting a much less ambitious goal, sidesteps the main difficulties faced in the above works and facil-
itates a result closer in spirit to the original Blackwell formulation. In Stackelberg stochastic games,
one agent (leader) takes an action first and the second agent (follower) takes the action next after
observing the action of the leader. However, the evolution of the state depends on the action of both
agents. A precise definition is given in the next section. For Stackelberg stochastic games, we recover
the necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability of convex sets and sufficient conditions for
non-convex sets. As expected, these conditions are similar to prior work on repeated and Markov cases,
but our proof is different as we rely on ideas from stochastic approximation theory for constructing an
approachability strategy. Stochastic approximation as a tool for analyzing approachability was also
used in [12], [13] where approachability for repeated games has been analyzed extensively.
The Markov case considered here and in [8] [9] [10] is significantly more complicated because the
dynamics interferes with the simple strategy of Blackwell. The works [8] [9] [10] consider general non-
cooperative stochastic games and establish analogous conditions for approachability as well as optimal
strategies. As mentioned above, they consider strategies which include a ‘waiting’ component, i.e.,
the updates are done only along a sub-sample, not every time. They differ in the manner the waiting
is effected. This ‘waiting’ facilitates learning by allowing pure exploration. As they consider the
general non-cooperative case, our approachability results are weaker insofar as they are restricted to
Stackelberg games. This way we impose an order in which the agents operate and allow the follower
to know the leader’s move, thus modifying the information structure. As will become apparent later,
this essentially makes it a combination of a zero sum game and a Markov decision process, both vastly
more amenable to analysis than the general non-cooperative case. This significantly simplifies the
analysis. The primary gain is that one now has a strategy sans any waiting, because updates can
be performed at each step. This takes away the potential degradation of convergence speed due to
waiting. The flip side is that this is a much more restrictive model.
Using multiple time scale stochastic approximation theory, we are also able to give a ‘learning’
scheme for Stackelberg stochastic games when the transition kernel is unknown. It appears difficult
to derive a learning scheme from approachability strategies for stochastic games from any of the prior
works (except [11]). Thus, our main contributions are: (i) a new strategy for approachability for
Stackelberg stochastic games recovering known characterizations in other paradigms for this case, and
(ii) stochastic approximation-based learning schemes for approachability when the transition kernel is
unknown.
We describe the problem in detail in the next section. A sufficient/necessary conditions and a
strategy for approachability of a convex set are specified in Section 3. Section 4 extends these to
non-convex targets. Section 5 describes a learning algorithm for approachability. Section 6 concludes
the paper with a brief remark about future directions.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a stochastic game with two agents, finite state space S, finite action space A = A1×A2 where
Ai is the action space of agent i, i = 1, 2. We shall denote by {sn, n ≥ 0} the S-valued state process.
An element a = (a1, a2) ∈ A is called an action vector. Let p(·, ·, ·) be the transition kernel that
governs the state evolution, p(s, a, ·) ∈ P(S) for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A where P(S) is the set of probability
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distributions over the set S. Let c : S × A → RK be the vector-cost function for agent 1, and for a
given state s ∈ S and an action vector a ∈ A, c(s, a) = [c1(s, a), . . . , cK(s, a)]
† where cj : S × A → R
for 1 ≤ j ≤ K. We assume that the cost function is bounded and without loss of generality assume
that |cj(s, a)| ≤ 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ K, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ A. The average vector-cost incurred for agent
1 till time n is denoted by xn =
1
n
∑n
m=1 c(sm, am), where {an = (a
1
n, a
2
n)} is the control sequence
being used. Note that this stochastic game reduces to a multi-objective MDP when A2 is a singleton.
Throughout, P(X) for a Polish space X will denote the Polish space of probability measures on X
with the Prohorov topology.
Remark 1. In a more general setting, the action space Ai of each agent i can depend on the current
state s ∈ S and is denoted by Ai(s). However, it is not difficult to show that all results in this work
can be extended to the case where the action space is state dependent at cost of some additional
notational complexity. This is straightforward from the corresponding results in MDPs and zero-sum
stochastic games [14]. We restrict to the former model for simplicity of notation.
In many situations, the transition probabilities are either unknown or too complex to afford ex-
plicit analytic handling of the dynamic programming equations, but a simulation device or actual
experimentation can provide input-output data (e.g., network simulators, robotics). In such cases a
popular approach to approximate dynamic programming is to use the so called reinforcement learning
algorithms, which essentially are stochastic approximation schemes to solve the dynamic program-
ming equations approximately. Developing such a learning algorithm for a general non-cooperative
stochastic game is known to be difficult except in very special cases such as zero-sum [15]. Here we
consider a natural relaxation of the problem as ‘game against nature’, and formalize it as a Stackelberg
stochastic game. In a Stackelberg stochastic game, at each time step n, agent 1 takes an action a1n
first. Player 2 (adversary) observes this action and then selects her action a2n.
Recall that a behavioral strategy for agent i is a sequence of functions which successively map the
available ‘history’ at any given time m to a probability distribution on Ai which gives the conditional
probability with which the action aim ∈ Ai is chosen. In a Stackelberg stochastic game, agent 1’s
behavioral strategy σ1 = [σ10 , σ
1
1 , · · · ] is a sequence of maps σ
1
m : S
m+1 ×Am1 7→ P(A1) and agent 2’s
(adversary) behavioral strategy σ2 = [σ20 , σ
2
1 , · · · ] is a sequence of maps σ
2
m : S
m+1×Am×A1 7→ P(A2),
because she also observes agent 1’s actions. When these conditional probabilities depend only on the
current state for agent 1 and on the current state and agent 1’s current action for agent 2, we shall call
them stationary strategies and identify them with maps π1 : S → P(A1) and π
2 : S × A1 → P(A2),
resp. Let Σi be the set of behavioral strategies of agent i, i = 1, 2. A pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1×Σ2
together with an initial state s0 induces a probability distribution µs0(σ
1, σ2) on the sequence of vectors
{xn}.
Our objective is to specify the conditions under which a given closed set is approachable, propose
a strategy for approachability and prescribe a learning algorithm for approachability. The notion of
an approachable set for stochastic games is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Approachable Set). A closed set D is approachable for agent 1 if there exists a behavioral
strategy σ1 for agent 1 such that ‖xn −D‖ → 0 as n→∞, µs0(σ
1, σ2)-almost surely for all σ2 ∈ Σ2,
and for all initial states s0 ∈ S.
Let Ψ denote the set of ergodic occupation measures over the set S × A. That is, any ψ ∈ Ψ can
be decomposed as ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π1(a1|s)π2(a2|s, a1) where:
• π1(·|s) ∈ P(A1), π2(·|s, a1) ∈ P(A2), and,
• ηψ is an invariant probability measure over S induced by the stationary policy pair (π1, π2) and
the controlled transition kernel p(·, ·, ·).
For any ψ ∈ Ψ, define the ergodic vector-cost function for agent i as
c(ψ) : Ψ→ RK =
 ∑
s,a1,a2
ψ(s, a1, a2)c1(s, a
1, a2), . . . ,
∑
s,a1,a2
ψ(s, a1, a2)cK(s, a
1, a2)
† (1)
3
Note that c(ψ) is the expected average vector-cost for agent i if both agents play a pair of stationary
strategies (π1, π2) such that ψ is the ergodic occupation measure induced by (π1, π2).
Remark: More generally, we may consider general behavioral strategies for either of both agents.
However, it follows from the results of [16], Chapter VI (see the proof of Theorem 1.1, pp. 58-59) that
under an arbitrary behavioral strategy pair, every limit point of {xn} as n ↑ ∞ will be of the form c(ψ)
for some ergodic occupation measure ψ. Thus there is no loss of attainable payoffs by restricting a
priori to stationary Markov policies (π1, π2) and moreover, the latter have the appeal of lower memory
requirements.
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The Markov chain induced by any pair of stationary strategies (π1, π2) by the agents
is irreducible.
This is a standard assumption made in reinforcement learning. The basic assumption in [8] is that
there exists a state s0 such that the mean first-passage time from any arbitrary state to s0 is finite
for all stationary strategies of the agents. This is the so called ‘uni-chain’ case. The consequences of
Assumption 1 that are of relevance here are ([17], Chapter 8):
1. the existence of a single communicating class under any stationary strategy,
2. accessibility (i.e., a.s. finite hitting time) for the communicating class from any state under any
stationary strategy,
3. a unique stationary distribution under any stationary strategy (implying in particular a unique
ergodic occupation measure),
4. an optimal stationary strategy exists that is optimal for any initial condition.
In fact, under Assumption 1, the whole state space is a communicating class, whereby the above
consequences are trivial. But they also hold under the seemingly weaker uni-chain hypothesis ([17],
Chapter 8). For the sake of completeness, we state the uni-chain assumption below:
Assumption 2 (Uni-chain MDP). An MDP is uni-chain if the transition matrix corresponding to
every deterministic stationary policy is uni-chain, that is, it consists of a single recurrent class plus a
possibly empty set of transient states.
Our core results for approachability will hold for the uni-chain case as well. The key fact that
ensures this is that under any stationary strategy the invariant distribution and therefore the ergodic
occupation measure is uniquely specified. Where we need the full strength of Assumption 1 is when
we develop the learning algorithm, which requires sufficient ‘exploration’ for learning, as will become
clear later. For the same reason, we also confine ourselves to a finite state space case, though the
results concerning approachability alone will go through for countable state space as in, e.g., [10],
under additional conditions that either ensure blanket stability (such as a suitable stochastic Liapunov
condition) or a suitable condition on costs that penalizes instability - see, e.g., Chapters VI, VII of
[16]. In [18] too a similar but weaker assumption is used. Our Assumption 1 is thus stronger than
that in [8] [18].
3 Conditions for Approachability of Convex Sets
In this section we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability of convex sets. We
note that these conditions have been given in previous work as well [8] [9]. Our main contribution
here is to give a new approachable strategy using stochastic approximation techniques that permits
continuous updates, albeit only for the special case of Stackelberg games. The main motivation
for providing a new approachable strategy, apart from the computational simplicity of the proposed
strategy, is that it is amenable to a learning scheme. We indeed use this strategy to propose a learning
scheme for approachability in Section 5. We assume that Assumption 2 is true throughout this section.
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For now we restrict our attention to a convex set D. Extension to a non-convex set is given in
Section 4.1. We begin by defining a few quantities. For any x ∈ RK \ D, let PD(x) denote the
(unique) projection of x onto D. Let λ(x) = (x− PD(x)) /‖x − PD(x)‖. For every x ∈ R
K \D, we
define a scalar-valued Stackelberg stochastic game with the stage cost c˜(s, a;x) = 〈c(s, a), λ(x)〉 where
〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product between two vectors. With respect to this scalar-valued Stackelberg
stochastic game, we define the following quantities:
c∗(x) = min
π1
max
π2
{〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉 : ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s)} (2)
Γπ1(x) = argmax
π2
{〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉 : ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s)} (3)
Π1(x) = argmin
π1
max
π2
{〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉 : ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s)} (4)
Ψ(x) = {ψ ∈ Ψ : ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s), π1 ∈ Π1(x), π2 ∈ Γπ1(x)} (5)
Ψ˜(x) = {ψ ∈ Ψ : 〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉 ≤ c∗(x)} (6)
Given an x ∈ RK \ D, Γπ1(x) can be interpreted as the set of stationary strategies of a worst
case adversary (agent 2) and Π1(x) can be thought as the set of best stationary strategies of agent 1
against this adversary. Ψ(x) is the ergodic occupation measures corresponding to these strategies.
Our main result of this section is the following theorem. The main content is part (ii) which
specifies a strategy for approachability. Part (i) and the necessary conditions that follow (Proposition
3) are known results [8]. They are included here also because the proofs have a bearing on what
follows. Note that together, these provide conditions for approachability that are both necessary and
sufficient.
Theorem 1. (i) (Sufficient Condition) A closed convex set D is approachable from all initial states in
a Stackelberg stochastic game satisfying Assumption 1 if for every x ∈ RK \D, there exists a (possibly
non-unique) occupation measure ψ, ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s), such that c(ψ) = c∗(x)
and 〈c(ψ)− PD(x), λ(x)〉 ≤ 0.
(ii) (Strategy for Approachability) A strategy for approachability is: At every time instant n, select
action a1n according to a policy π
1(·|xn) ∈ Π
1(xn).
The proof is based on stochastic approximation theory [19]. The average vector-cost till time step
n+ 1 can be written as
xn+1 =
1
n+ 1
n+1∑
m=0
c(sm, am) (7)
= xn + γ(n)(c(sn+1, an+1)− xn)
= xn + γ(n)
((
c(sn+1, π
1(·|xn), a
2
n+1)− xn
)
+Mn+1
)
, (8)
where
γ(n) = 1/(n + 1),
c(sn+1, π
1(·|xn), a
2
n+1) =
∑
a1∈A1
π1(a1|xn)c(sn+1, a
1, a2n+1),
and Mn+1 =
(
c(sn+1, a
1
n+1, a
2
n+1)− c(sn+1, π(·|xn), a
2
n+1)
)
. (9)
The key idea in the analysis of (7) is to show that it asymptotically tracks the differential inclusion
dynamics given by the differential inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ w(x(t)) − x(t), (10)
where
w(x) := co
(
{c(ψ˜) : ψ˜ ∈ Ψ˜(x)}
)
and co(·) denotes the closed convex hull of a set. Then, by showing that the dynamics given by (10)
converges to the set D, we will conclude that the sequence {xn} also converges to the same set a.s.
We start with the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The sets Ψ(x) and Ψ˜(x) are compact, non-empty and the set-valued maps χ : x 7→
Ψ(x), χ˜ : x 7→ Ψ˜(x) are upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Consider the Stackelberg stochastic game wherein at each time instant n, the state is sn ∈ S and
agent 1 moves first and generates a randomized action a1n ∈ A
1 according to conditional law π1(·|sn),
followed by agent 2 who observes a1n and chooses a randomized action according to the conditional
law π2(·|sn, a
1
n). Thus agent 2 faces an average reward MDP with state process (sn, a
1
n), n ≥ 0, and
transition probability p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2) := p(s, (a1, a2), s˜)π1(a˜1|s˜). For a given x ∈ RK \ D, the
optimal adversarial policy π2 by agent 2 for the scalar-valued MDP with cost function 〈c(s, a), λ(x)〉
can be characterized as the maximizer in the associated dynamic programming equation
V ((s, a1)) = max
π2
∑
(s˜,a˜1)
∑
a2
π2(a2|s, a1)p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2)
(
〈c(s, a1, a2), λ(x)〉 + V ((s˜, a˜1))
)− β.
(11)
This has a solution (V, β) where β is unique and V is unique upto an additive scalar and can be
rendered unique by arbitrarily setting V ((s0, a
1
0)) = 0 for some s0, a
1
0. Then Γπ1(x) defined above is
simply the set of maximizers on the R.H.S. Being the set of maximizers of an affine function on a
convex compact set, it is a non-empty convex compact set. We see below that it is an upper semicon-
tinuous set valued map as a function of x.
Now consider the MDP with state process {sn} and stationary randomized policies π((a
1, a2)|s)
:= π1(a1|s)π2(a2|s, a1) where π1(·|s) ∈ P(A1) and π2(·|s, a1) ∈ Γπ1(x). That is, the action space for
the problem is Φ := ∪π1∈P(A1)
(
{π1} × Γπ1(x)
)
with the relative topology inherited from P(A1×A2).
Being a closed subset of a compact space, it is compact. By our definition of Γπ1(x), the optimal policy
for this MDP corresponds to the min-max policy for the original problem, i.e., belongs to Π1(x). This
in turn is given by the minimizers on the right hand side of the dynamic programming equation
Vˆ (s) = min
π∈Φ
∑
s˜
∑
a1,a2
π1(a1|s)π2(a2|s, a1)p(s, (a1, a2), s˜)
(
〈c(s, a1, a2), λ(x)〉 + Vˆ (s˜)
)− βˆ, (12)
which has a solution (Vˆ , βˆ), where βˆ is unique and Vˆ is unique upto an additive scalar and can be
rendered unique by arbitrarily fixing, say, Vˆ (s0) = 0. In either (11) or (12), if we replace x by xn
with xn → x∞, then any subsequential limit (V
′
∞, β
′
∞), (Vˆ
′
∞, βˆ
′
∞) of the corresponding (V
′ = V ′n, β
′ =
β′n), (Vˆ
′ = Vˆ ′n, βˆ
′ = βˆ′n) must satisfy the respective dynamic programming equations (11),(12), with
V ′∞((s0, a
1
0)) = Vˆ
′
∞(s0) = 0. By the uniqueness claim above, they are the appropriate value functions
for x = x∞. Furthermore, if we pick π
2
n to be a maximizer on the right hand side of (11) for
(V ′n, β
′
n), n ≥ 1, any limit point thereof as n ↑ ∞ must be a maximizer of the same for n = ∞. A
similar argument works for the minimizers of (12). It is easy to deduce from this that the graph of
χ is closed. Hence, χ is upper semi-continuous. The foregoing also implies that the minmax value is
continuous in x. This in particular implies that c∗(·) is continuous. The claim regarding Ψ˜(·) follows
from this.
We now recall some conditions that will ensure the well-posedness of (10), along with its proof for
sake of completeness.
Proposition 2. For each x ∈ RK \D, the set w(x) is convex, compact. Also the map w : x 7→ w(x)
is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. The set w(x) is clearly bounded from the boundedness assumption on the cost c(·). Also, w(x)
is convex by definition. Now, consider the mapping h(x) := {c(ψ˜) : ψ˜ ∈ Ψ˜(x)}. Since Ψ˜(x) is compact,
and c(·) is continuous, h(x) is compact. Then, w(x), the closed convex hull of h(x), is also compact.
The upper semicontinuity of h is clear from the upper semicontinuity of Ψ˜. Then the closed convex
hull of h(x), i.e., w(x), is also upper semicontinuous, by [19, Lemma 5, Chapter 5].
The basic approach to the analysis of (7) is to construct a suitable continuous interpolated tra-
jectory x(t), t ≥ 0, and show that it asymptotically almost surely approaches the solution set of
(10). This is done as follows: Define t(0) = 0, t(n) =
∑n−1
m=0 γ(m),m ≥ 1. Clearly t(n) ↑ ∞. Let
In := [t(n), t(n + 1)), n ≥ 0. Define a continuous, piecewise linear x(t), t ≥ 0 by x(t(n)) = xn, n ≥ 0,
with linear interpolation in each interval In. That is,
x(t) = xn + (xn+1 − xn)
t− t(n)
t(n+ 1)− t(n)
, t ∈ In. (13)
Define a P(S × A)-valued random process µ(t) = [[µ(t, (s, a))]], t ≥ 0, by
µ(t, (s, a)) := δ(sn,an)((s, a)), t ∈ In, n ≥ 0, (14)
where δ is the Kronecker delta function. Also, define for t > v ≥ 0, and for B Borel in [v, t],
µtv(B × (s, a)) :=
1
t− v
∫
B
µ(y, (s, a))dy.
Two necessary conditions for the analysis in [19] to carry through are:
1. Almost surely, supn ‖xn‖ <∞.
2. Almost surely, for any t > 0, the set {µv+tv , v ≥ 0} remains tight.
Since we are dealing with only finite spaces, we don’t need to worry about the measurability issues
discussed in [19]. For the same reason, conditions 1 and 2 are also true.
For ν ∈ P(S × A), define
h˜(x, ν) :=
∑
(s,a)∈S×A
(c(s, a)− x) ν(s, a)
For µ(·) defined in (14), consider the non-autonomous o.d.e.
x˙(t) = h˜(x(t), µ(t)) (15)
Let xv(t), t ≥ v, denote the solution to (15) with xv(v) = x(v), for v ≥ 0.
A set A ∈ RK is said to be an invariant set for a differential inclusion if for x(0) ∈ A there is
some trajectory x(t), t ∈ (−∞,∞) thereof that lies entirely in A. The invariant set is said to be an
internally chain transitive invariant set if for any x, y ∈ A and any ǫ > 0, T > 0, there exists an n ≥ 1
and points x0 = x, x1, . . . , xn−1, xn = y in A, such that some trajectory of the differential inclusion
initiated at xi meets with the ǫ-neighborhood of xi+1 for 0 ≤ i < n after a time t ≥ T . That is, we
can reach from any point in the set to any other by traversing finitely many trajectory segments of
the differential inclusion interspersed with small jumps. If we saw these through a microscope that
cannot detect such jumps, it would appear like a periodic trajectory. This may appear too general,
but it does narrow down the possibilities significantly. In fact the whole space is an invariant set for
the dynamics, but not necessarily internally chain transitive, indicating in particular that ‘invariant
set’ by itself is not a sufficiently informative qualification. Examples of internally chain transitive
invariant sets are isolated equilibria, limit cycles, etc. In fact, if x(·) is a bounded trajectory of the
differential inclusion, then its ω-limit set ∩t≥0{x(s), s ≥ t} (which can depend on the initial condition)
is an internally chain transitive invariant set: this follows because the proof of the theorem below
also works for the differential inclusion itself. An interesting example of internally chain transitive
invariant sets is the Lorenz attractor [20]. Also, please see Chapter 3 of [21] for a detailed description.
We use the following important result from [12] (see also [19]).
Theorem 2. [12, Theorem 4.3], [19, Theorem 7, Chapter 6] Under Assumption 1, almost surely,
{x(v + ·), v ≥ 0} converge to an internally chain transitive invariant set of the differential inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ {h˜(x(t), ν) : ν ∈ Ψ(x(t))} := w(x(t)) − x(t) (16)
as t ↑ ∞. In particular, {xn} converge a.s. to such a set.
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Remark 2. The above theorem summarizes the idea of averaging over natural time-scale method which
we use in the analysis. It shows that even though the opponent’s strategy can be non-stationary, we
can restrict our attention to the set of occupation measures corresponding to the stationary strategies.
We now show that any path corresponding to the differential inclusion dynamics given by (10)
converges to the set D. Some definitions are in order: A compact invariant set M is called an attrac-
tor of a dynamical system if it has an open neighborhood O such that every trajectory in O remains
in O and converges to M . The largest such O is called the domain of attraction. An attractor M is
called a global attractor if the domain of attraction is RK .
We now give the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. We construct the interpolated trajectory x(t), t ≥ 0 of (7) as defined in equation (13). By
Theorem 2, almost surely {x(v + ·), v ≥ 0} converge to an internally chain transitive invariant set
of the differential inclusion given by (10). In particular this implies that {xn} converge a.s. to such
a set. Consider the Lyapunov function V (x) = minz∈D
1
2‖x − z‖
2. Since ∇V (x) = (x − PD(x)),
d
dt
V (x(t)) = 〈∇V (x(t)), x˙(t)〉 = 〈x(t)− PD(x(t)), y(t)〉 for y(t) ∈ w(x(t)) − x(t).
By Proposition 1 and our hypotheses, there exists an occupation measure ψ such that ψ(s, a1, a2) =
ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s), and c∗(x) = 〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉 ≤ 〈PD(x), λ(x)〉. Then for any policy ψ˜x ∈ Ψ˜(x)
(which can be chosen to be measurable in x by a standard measurable selection theorem [22]), we have
〈c(ψ˜x), λ(x)〉 ≤ c
∗(x) ≤ 〈PD(x), λ(x)〉. So for any x(·) satisfying (16),
〈c(ψ˜x(t))− PD(x(t)), x(t) − PD(x(t)〉 ≤ 0 for all ψ˜x(·) ∈ Ψ˜(x(·))
and hence 〈c(ψ˜x(t))− x(t), x(t)− PD(x(t)〉 ≤ −‖x(t)− PD(x(t))‖
2. This gives
d
dt
V (x(t)) ≤ −2V (x(t))
so that
V (x(t)) ≤ V (x(0))e−2t.
Thus D is a global attractor. Then the internally chain invariant set corresponding to the differential
inclusion (10) is a subset of D [19] . Hence, {xn} converges to D a.s., proving the first claim. The
proof of the second claim is also implied by the foregoing.
We complete the characterization by specifying the necessary conditions for approachability.
Proposition 3 (Necessary Condition). If a closed convex set D is approachable from all initial states
in an arbitrary Stackelberg stochastic game satisfying Assumption 1, then
(i) every half-space containing D is approachable, and
(ii) ∀x, there exists an occupation measure ψ, ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s), such that c(ψ) =
c∗(x) and 〈c(ψ)− PD(x), λ(x)〉 ≤ 0.
Proof. Claim (i) is obvious. We now show that (i) implies (ii) and complete the argument.
Let x ∈ RK \D and Hx be the supporting half-space to the set D at the point PD(x) given by
Hx := {y ∈ R
K : 〈y − PD(x), λ(x)〉 ≤ 0}.
Since every half-space containing D is approachable, there exists a strategy σ1 for agent 1 such that
for any (Stackelberg) strategy σ2 of agent 2, lim supn→∞〈xn − PD(x), λ(x)〉 ≤ 0, µ(σ
1, σ2) a.s. Since
|〈xn − PD(x), λ(x)〉| is bounded,
inf
σ1
sup
σ2
lim sup
n→∞
Eµ(σ1,σ2)[〈xn, λ(x)〉] ≤ inf
σ1
sup
σ2
Eµ(σ1,σ2)[lim sup
n→∞
〈xn, λ(x)〉] ≤ 〈PD(x), λ(x)〉 (17)
Note that the L.H.S. of equation (17) is the min-max cost for agent 1 in the average cost scalar-valued
Stackelberg stochastic game with stage cost c˜(s, a;x) = 〈c(s, a), λ(x)〉. By the arguments in the proof
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of Proposition 1, the min-max cost is achieved by a pair of stationary Markov policies (π1(·|·), π2(·|·, ·))
obtained by solving a pair of dynamic programs, implying in particular that there exists a ψ ∈ Ψ(x)
such that the L.H.S. is equal to 〈c(ψ), λ(x)〉. This completes the proof.
Remark 3. The differential inclusion trajectory approaches D at an exponential rate. There is, how-
ever, a time scaling n 7→ t(n) in our passage from the original iterates to the differential inclusion
approximation. Since t(n) =
∑n
m=0 γ1(m) and γ1(n) =
1
n+1 , t(n) ≈ log n. Thus exponential decay
translates into an inverse power law decay in the original time scale. There is a further issue of dis-
cretization errors and errors due to noise. As shown in [19], Chapter 4, the interpolated iterates x¯(·)
remain within a small tube a differential inclusion trajectory after n ≥ n0 steps
1 with probability
exceeding
1−O(
(
e
− C∑
∞
m=n0
γ1(m)
2
)
(18)
for some constant C > 0, which for γ1(n) :=
1
n+1 becomes an exponential decay in n.
4 Extensions
4.1 Extension to Non-Convex Sets
We now give the approachability result when the target set is non-convex. The proof is the same
as that of Theorem 1 except for the fact that the Lyapunov function may be non-differentiable. We
overcome this difficulty by considering semidifferentials and a general version of the envelope theorem
[23]. We assume that Assumption 2 is true throughout this section.
We first give some some basic definitions and results from [23, Pages 29, 42-46] that are required
for the proof.
Definition 2 (Semi-differentials). Let V : RK → R. The super and sub-differential of V (or semi-
differentials) at x, D+V (x) and D−V (x), are defined as
D+V (x) :=
{
p ∈ RK : lim sup
y→x
V (y)− V (x)− p · (y − x)
|x− y|
≤ 0
}
D−V (x) :=
{
p ∈ RK : lim inf
y→x
V (y)− V (x)− p · (y − x)
|x− y|
≥ 0
}
Let V be such that
V (x) := inf
z∈D
g(x, z)
where g : RK ×D → R, D ⊂ RK . Assume that,
(A1) g is bounded and g(·, z) differentiable at x uniformly in z, (19)
(A2) z 7−→ Dxg(x, z) is continuous and z 7−→ g(x, z) lower semicontinous, (20)
where Dxg is the partial derivative of g w.r.t. x. Let
P˜D(x) := argmin
z∈D
g(x, z) := {z ∈ D : V (x) = g(x, z)}, Y (x) := {Dxg(x, z) : z ∈ P˜D(x)}
Also, the (one-sided) directional derivative of V in the direction of q is
D+V (x)(q) := lim
h→0+
V (x+ hq)− V (x)
h
.
We use the following general version of the envelope theorem.
1The estimates of ibid. are for an o.d.e. limit, but a similar argument works for differential inclusion limits.
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Proposition 4. [23, Proposition 2.13, Page 44] Let D be a compact set and g satisfies assumptions
(19)-(20). Then,
Y (x) 6= ∅
D+V (x) = coY (x)
D−V (x) =
{
{y} if Y (x) = {y}
∅ if Y (x) is not a singleton
Moreover, V has the (one-sided) directional derivative in any direction q, given by
D+V (x)(q) = min
y∈Y (x)
y · q = min
p∈D+V (x)
p · q
Let g(x, z) = ‖x− z‖2. Then P˜D(x) is the set of points in D that are closest to x ∈ R
K \D.
Theorem 3. (i) (Sufficient Condition) A closed set D is approachable from all initial states in the
stochastic game satisfying Assumption 1 if for every x ∈ RK \D and for each PD(x) ∈ P˜D(x), there
exists an occupation measure ψ, ψ(s, a1, a2) = ηψ(s)π2(a2|s, a1)π1(a1|s), such that c(ψ) = c∗(x) and
〈c(ψ) − PD(x), λ(x)〉 ≤ 0.
(ii) (Strategy for Approachability) A strategy for approachability is: At every time instant n, select a
PD(x) ∈ P˜D(x), and select action a
1
n according to the policy π
1(·|xn) such that π
1(·|xn) ∈ Π
1(xn).
Proof. Let V (x) = minz∈D
1
2‖x− z‖
2 be the Lyapunov function. Then by Proposition 4,
D+V (x) = co{(x− PD(x)) : PD(x) ∈ P˜D(x)}.
Let v(t) = V (x(t)) and D+v(t) its right derivative. By chain rule [24, Proposition 7, Page 288],
D+v(t) = D+V (x(t))(x˙(t)) = D+V (x(t))(y(t)) for some y(t) ∈ w(x(t)) − x(t).
As before, we can also show that for all PD(x(t)) ∈ P˜D(x(t)),
〈c(ψ˜x(t))− x(t), x(t) − PD(x(t))〉 ≤ −‖x(t)− PD(x(t))‖
2 = −2V (x(t)) = −2v(t).
Then,
D+v(t) = min
PD(x(t))∈P˜D(x(t))
〈c(ψ˜x(t))− x(t), x(t)− PD(x(t)〉 ≤ −2v(t)
and by [24, Proposition 8, Page 289], we get
v(t)− v(0) + 2
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτ ≤ 0.
By Gronwall inequality,
v(t) ≤ v(0)e−2t.
The rest of the proof is the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.
4.2 Perfect Information Stochastic Games
We can extend our results to a special class of simultaneous move games called perfect information
stochastic games defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let Ai(s) be the set of feasible actions that the agent i can select when the state is s.
A stochastic game is said to be a game of perfect information if the state space S can be partitioned
into two disjoint sets S1 and S2 such that |A2(s)| = 1 for s ∈ S1 and |A1(s)| = 1 for s ∈ S2.
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In words, at any given state s at least one of the agents has only a single action available.
It is easy to see that the quantities defined in equations (2)-(6) for a Stackelberg stochastic game
are well defined for a perfect information simultaneous move stochastic game. Note that the only
change will be in the way we define the adversary’s (agent 2) strategy. In the Stackelberg game, it is
denoted as π2(a2|s, a1). However, in a perfect information game, π2(a2|s, a1) = π2(a2|s) for s ∈ S2
and π2(a2|s, a1) = δa0(a
2) for s ∈ S1 where a0 is the single action available to agent 2 when s ∈ S
1.
In Section 3 we explicitly used the Stackleberg game assumption mainly to prove Proposition 1. We
needed that assumption to decouple the dynamics as a combination of a zero-sum game and an MDP.
In particular, the proof of the proposition starts by observing that the adversary (agent 2) faces an
average reward MDP. It is easy to see that this observation is true in the case of a perfect information
simultaneous move stochastic game as well. When the state s ∈ S1, the adversary’s decision is trivial:
select action a0. When the state s ∈ S
2, it faces a completely observed MDP because the action of
agent 1 is known (since the action space is a singleton). So, the proof of Proposition 1 will carry
through. The proof of Theorem 1 depends on the Stackleberg assumption only via Proposition 1. So,
our main result (Theorem 1) extends naturally to the case of a perfect information simultaneous move
stochastic game.
However, it is not immediately clear if our approach can be extended to a switching-controller
stochastic game. Switching-controller stochastic game is a generalized version of perfect information
stochastic games. The transition kernels are such that when the state s ∈ Si, only agent i can influence
the transition. But the other agent’s action set need not be a singleton. So the adversary is facing a
partially observed MDP when s ∈ S2. Also, its decision making when the state s ∈ S1 is not trivial
because the action set is not a singleton. So, the proof of Proposition 1 doesn’t carry through directly.
We plan to address this issue in a future work.
5 A Learning Algorithm for Approachability in Stochastic Stackel-
berg Games
Approachability theorem for Stackelberg stochastic games that we proved above shows that if agent
1 selects her action at time step n according to the policy π1(·|xn) such that π
1(·|xn) ∈ Π
1(xn), then
xn approaches the desired set D. Given xn, such a policy can be easily computed if one knows the
transition kernel p(·, ·, ·). The problem of ‘learning’ arises when this transition kernel is unknown and
the objective of the learning algorithm is to ‘learn’ such a policy π1(·|xn) at each time step n. We
give an algorithm which indeed does this. We do this by considering the problem as learning in two
coupled MDPs. We assume that Assumption 1 is true throughout this section.
The proposed algorithm below is a two time scale stochastic approximation algorithm. We use
two step-size sequences γ1(n) and γ2(n). The step-sizes γ(n) = γ1(n), γ2(n) satisfy the conditions∑
n
γ(n) =∞,
∑
n
γ2(n) <∞ (21)
sup
n
γ([yn])
γ(n)
<∞,
∑[yn]
m=0 γ(m)∑n
m=0 γ(m)
→ 1 uniformly in y ∈ (0, 1) (22)
with the additional stipulation that γ1(n) = o(γ2(n)).
We give the asynchronous learning algorithm below. The synchronous scheme may be written
analogously. Note that in the following {a1n} denotes the actual control actions of agent 1 while {a
2
n}
denotes the simulated control actions of agent 2. The actual control actions of agent 2 is denoted by
{a¯2n}. The reason for this demarcation is explained later.
Learning Algorithm:
1. Initialize n = 0. Initialize the Q-values Q̂0(s, a
1, a2) = Q˜0(s, a
1, a2) = 0,∀s, a1, a2.
Set average cost vector x0 = 0. Observe the state s0.
Select an action a10 ∈ A
1 uniformly at random.
Agent 2 takes action a¯20. Observe the cost c(s0, a
1
0, a¯
2
0)
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2. Update the time step n← n+ 1
3. Observe sn+1. Simulate aˆ
1
n+1 according to the distribution π
ǫ,1
n (c.f. equation (29)).
Update the Q-value Q̂n+1(s, a
1, a2) according to (25)
4. Update the Q-value Q˜n+1(s, a
1, a2) according to (26)
5. Choose action a1n+1 according to the policy π
ǫ,1
n+1 as defined in (29)
6. Simulate action a2n+1 according to the policy π
ǫ,2
n+1 as defined in (29)
7. Agent 2 takes action a¯2n+1. Observe the cost c(sn+1, a
1
n+1, a¯
2
n+1)
8. Update the average cost according to (23)
9. Update νˆ(n+ 1, s, a1, a2) according to (30)
10. Return to step 2
xn+1 = xn + γ1(n)
(
c(sn+1, a
1
n+1, a¯
2
n+1)− xn
)
, γ1(n) = 1/(n + 1), (23)
ǫn+1 = ǫn(1− γ1(n)), (24)
Q̂n+1((s, a
1), a2) = Q̂n((s, a
1), a2) + γ2(νˆ(n, s, a
1, a2))I{((sn, a
1
n), a
2
n) = ((s, a
1), a2)}(
c˜((s, a1), a2;xn) + max
z
Q̂n((sn+1, aˆ
1
n+1), z)− f(Q̂n)− Q̂n((s, a
1), a2)
)
, (25)
Q˜n+1(s, (a
1, a2)) = Q˜n(s, (a
1, a2)) + γ2(νˆ(n, s, a
1, a2))I{sn = s, a
1
n = a
1}
×
(
c˜(s, a1n, a
2
n;xn) + min
y
Q˜n(sn+1, (y, argmax
z
Q̂n+1(s, y, z)))
− f(Q˜n)− Q˜n(s, (a
1, a2))
)
, (26)
π1n+1(a
1|s) = δa∗(1)(a
1), where (27)
a∗(1) := argmin
a1
Q˜n+1(s, (a
1, argmax
a2
Q̂n+1(s, a
1, a2))).
π2n+1(a
2|(s, a1)) = δ(a∗(1),a∗(2))((a
1, a2)), where (28)
a∗(2) := argmax
a2
Q̂n+1(s, a
∗(1), a2).
Here the actual control process {a1n} for agent 1 and simulated control actions {a
2
n} for agent 2 are
governed by the randomized Markov policy
πǫ,in+1(·) = (1− ǫn)π
i
n+1(·) + ǫnµ
i(·), (29)
where µi := the uniform distribution on Ai, i = 1, 2,.
The function f is any Lipschitz function satisfying the following properties: For the all 1 vector
e, f(e) = 1, f(y + ce) = f(y) + c and f(cy) = cf(y) for c ∈ R. As a simple example, we can set
f(Q) = Q(s0, a0) for a fixed s0 ∈ S, a0 ∈ A. Other possible choices are maximum, minimum or
arithmetic mean of {Q(i, s)}. Also,
νˆ(n, s, a1, a2) =
n∑
m=1
I{(s, a1, a2) = (sm, a
1
m, a
2
m)}. (30)
The synchronous scheme is analogous except that all components of {Q̂n}, {Q˜n} are updated
simultaneously. Thus the indicators I{((sn, a
1
n), a
2
n) = ((s, a
1), a2)} in (25) and I{sn = s, a
1
n = a} in
(26) drop out and the stepsizes γ2(νˆ(n, s, a
1, a2)) are replaced by γ2(n).
Assumption 3. Relative sampling frequency of state-action pairs is bounded away from zero, i.e.,
lim inf
n→∞
νˆ(n, s, a1, a2)
n+ 1
> 0 a.s. ∀ (s, (a1, a2)) ∈ S ×A. (31)
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This is not ensured automatically by the above choice of π1n+1, so one usually employs some
randomization to ensure adequate ‘exploration’ implicit in the condition (31). One way to do so is to
choose some 0 < ǫ << 1 and use instead πǫ,1n+1(s, ·) defined in (29) with ǫn ≡ ǫ > 0 and µ is uniform
on A1. This will ensure that any combination (s, a1) will have relative frequency bounded away from
zero. Our slow decrease of ǫn will effectively achieve the same effect by the ‘two time scale’ argument
as we see later.
Our requirement, however, is for the corresponding statement for all triplets (s, a1, a2), not just for
a1. The control sequence {a2n} is chosen by agent 2, or ‘nature’, so we cannot ordain this, nor can we
suppose that agent 2 run the Q-learning algorithm stipulated above. We can, however, ensure this by
changing the interpretation of the algorithm, which we describe next. We use the terms ‘adversary’,
‘nature’ and ‘agent 2’ interchangeably.
That ‘nature’ choose controls to satisfy (31) is not required at all if we view (25) and subsequent
choice of a∗(2) that follows as agent 1’s simulation of the worst case behavior of agent 2. Thus this
becomes an ‘off-line’ algorithm for agent 2. We briefly recall what this distinction means. In Q-
learning, the minimizer of the estimated Q function over the control variable gives an estimate of the
optimal control choice at a given state (which forms the first argument of the Q function). There is
no requirement, however, that the actual simulation be carried out according to the policy suggested
by this choice. It can be any admissible state-control process as long as (31) is satisfied. This is the
off-line situation in contrast with the online case wherein {(sn, an)} is not a simulation, but an actual
run of the control system, so the control choice matters. Here we are perforce considering an on-line
situation for agent 1 who wants to drive the averaged vector cost to a target set, but s/he is free
to simulate the adversary’s behavior assuming the worst case, so that the latter becomes an off-line
simulation. Therefore while (31) imposes restrictions on agent 1’s control choices as noted above,
there can be no a priori restriction on agent 2’s control choices because they are only simulated and
therefore can be chosen at will, in particular so as to satisfy (31). Note, however, that the iterates
(23) must be performed according to actual observed costs.
That is, the adversary’s control choices entering (23) are the actual control choices of the adversary
so that c(sn+1, a¯n+1) is the true cost observed, whereas the control choices of the adversary entering
(25)-(26) are the simulated ones as stated. We have demarcated this by using the notation a¯n =
(a1n, a¯
2
n) for actual controls used as opposed to an = (a
1
n, a
2
n) for the simulated ones. Of course, the
first component of these is common.
Remark 4. It is also possible that we do not explicitly know the function c(·, ·), but observe a noisy
version thereof, say, c˘(n) = c(xn, a¯n) + a zero mean independent noise variable with finite second
moment. Then we replace c(sn+1, a¯n+1) in (23) by this noisy observation. We need not do so for the
occurrences of c, c˜ in the rest of the algorithm, because there we actually need to plug in the function
value at the appropriate state-control combination, which is known because the function c is known.
The zero mean noise in observed cost can be absorbed into the ‘martingale difference noise’ termMn+1
in (9) for (23). This does not affect the stochastic approximation based analysis thereof.
Remark 5. The recent work of Yu and Bertsekas [25] gives an elegant and highly intricate argument
in case of single agent Q-learning for stochastic shortest path problems that relaxes (31) to the weaker
requirement that ν˜(n, s, a1) ↑ ∞ a.s. A similar result should be possible in the present context, which
will make the requirement (31) unnecessary.
Explanation of the learning algorithm:
The explanation for these iterations is as follows, which also gives an intuition about the con-
vergence proof to follow. As in classical Blackwell approachability, agent 1 hedges against the worst
possible behavior of the adversary, i.e., agent 2, whose exact strategy agent 1 may not know. This
reduces it to a position-dependent zero-sum game in the following manner. Given the present value
of the vector average cost, agent 1 wants to maximize its drift towards the target set. If she hedges
against the possibility of agent 2 minimizing the same, she ensures movement towards the target set
in the worst possible scenario. Thus we have the MDPs associated with agent 1 and 2 as in the proof
of Proposition 1.
If we fix xn ≡ x and π
1
n ≡ π
1, agent 2 faces the MDP: Control the chain {(sn, a
1
n)} with controlled
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transition probabilities
p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2) := p(s, (a1, a2), s˜)π1(a˜1|s˜)
with control variable a2, so as to maximize the ergodic cost
lim
n↑∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E[〈c(sm, a
1
m, a
2
m), λ(x)〉]. (32)
(We use ‘lim’ in place of the usual ‘lim inf’ because of our prior restriction to stationary strategies
justified in section 2.) The dynamic programming equation for this control problem was noted to be
(11). Denoting the term in large parentheses on the right hand side of (11) as Qˇ((s, a1), a2), we have
the corresponding equation for ‘Q-values’ Qˇ((·, ·), ·) as
Qˇ((s, a1), a2) =
∑
(s˜,a˜1)
p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2)
(
〈c(s, a1, a2), λ(x)〉 +max
b
Qˇ((s˜, a˜1), b)
)
− β. (33)
This has the advantage compared to (11) of having the nonlinearity, i.e., the max operator, inside the
conditional expectation, i.e., averaging w.r.t. p˜. This allows us to write a stochastic approximation
scheme to solve the fixed point equation (33) by first replacing the conditional average by an evaluation
at a random variable realized according to p˜ and then making an incremental correction in the left
hand side based on the difference between the right hand side and the left hand side. The incremental
corrections with suitably chosen weights lead to a stochastic approximation scheme which does the
conditional averaging for you. This will be
Qˇn+1((s, a
1), a2) = Qˇn((s, a
1), a2) + γ2(νˆ(n, s, a
1, a2))I{((sn, a
1
n), a
2
n) = ((s, a
1), a2)}
×
(
c˜((s, a1), a2;x) + max
z
Qˇn((sn+1, a
1
n+1), z)− f(Qˇn)− Qˇn((s, a
1), a2)
)
.
(34)
Here f(Qˇn) is a surrogate for β which is also unknown a priori and gets specified by (33) as the optimal
reward. If we generate samples according to p˜ by a single simulation run of a Markov chain {(sn, a
1
n)}
governed by p˜, we see only the transition out of the current state at a given time and therefore can
update only the component corresponding to the current state. This is incorporated in the above by
means of the indicator I{((sn, a
1
n), a
2
n) = ((s, a
1), a2)}, which makes this an asynchronous stochastic
approximation. This is the celebrated Q-learning algorithm. Our iteration (25) is exactly the same
as (34) above with xn ≡ x, π
1
n ≡ π
1. Thus in the present framework, Q̂n replace Qˇn and are the
estimates for Q-function for the MDP faced by agent 2. Q˜n are estimates for the Q-function for the
MDP faced by agent 1 and π1n are estimates for its strategy. Both xn and ǫn are updated on a slower
‘algorithmic’ timescale compared to Q̂n because of our conditions γ2(n) = o(γ1(n)), and therefore
can be considered ‘quasi-static’ for the analysis of (25) by the theory of ‘two time scale stochastic
approximation’ as we shall see below. That is, we can treat them as constant for analyzing (25).
This will allow us to conclude that Q̂n asymptotically track the optimal Q-value for agent 2’s MDP
parametrized by the slowly varying xn, ǫn. To be precise,
‖δargmaxz Q̂n(·,·,z) − Γπ1n(xn)‖ → 0 a.s. (35)
Recall that the dependence on ǫn is via the actual control policy implemented, see (32) and the
discussion below.
Consider (26) next. Again, xn, ǫn can be treated as quasi-static for this and (35) holds. Then the
problem faced by agent 1 is to minimize
max
π2
lim
n↑∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E[〈c(sm, a
1
m, a
2
m), λ(x)〉].
Thus agent 1 faces the dynamic programming equation (12) where π2 is chosen to be optimal for agent
2. Equation (26) then represents the Q-learning algorithm for agent 1 with δ
argmaxz Q̂n(·,·,z)
serving as
the estimate for optimal π2, justified by (35).
Our main convergence theorem is the following:
14
Theorem 4. For the learning algorithm for approachability in Stackelberg stochastic game given by
equations (23) - (27), ‖xn −D‖ → 0 almost surely.
Proof. The proof progresses in several steps. Since it uses known ideas from previous work in the con-
text of Markov decision processes, we shall be brief with details where they are lengthy but essentially
the same as the MDP case, giving precise pointers to the literature.
• Step 1: Convergence of {Q̂n}:
We first argue that {Q̂n} converge a.s. assuming that they remain bounded a.s., which we prove
subsequently. The proof is based on the ‘o.d.e. approach’ for analysis of stochastic approximation
algorithms. We first consider the corresponding synchronous scheme. Since γ1(n) = o(γ2(n)),
(23) is on a slower time scale than (25) and we analyze (25) treating xn ≈ x as frozen by the
two time scale argument of section 6.1, [19]. Likewise we treat ǫn ≈ ǫ as frozen as it varies on
the same time scale as {xn}. The limiting o.d.e. for (25) then is
q˙(t) = F x(q(t))− q(t), (36)
where components of q(·), F x(·) are indexed by (s, a1, a2) listed lexicographically with
F x(s,a1,a2)(q) := c˜((s, a
1), a2;x)− f(q)− q((s, a1), a2) +∑
(s˜,a˜1)
p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2)max
a′
q((s, a1), a′). (37)
The convergence of this to the unique fixed point of F x follows exactly as in Theorem 3.5 of [26].
The boundedness proof also follows essentially as in ibid. using the arguments of [27] (see also
section 3.2 of [19]) with a slight tweak which we return to after considering the asynchronous
case, still under a.s. boundedness assumption. For the asynchronous case, by the arguments of
[28] (see also Chapter 7 of [19]), (36) gets modified to
q˙(t) = Λ(t)(F x(q(t))− q(t))
= F xΛ(t)(q(t)) − q(t), (38)
where Λ(t) is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements in [0, 1], and F xΛ(q) for any such matrix Λ
is defined as (I−Λ)q+ΛF x(q). Furthermore, (31) ensures that a.s., the diagonal elements of Λ(t)
remain uniformly bounded away from zero from below by some (possibly random) δ > 0. The
a.s. convergence again follows as in Theorem 3.5 of [26] using the fact that the asymptotically
stable equilibrium in the synchronous case remains the asymptotically stable equilibrium in this
case as well even with the time dependence via Λ(t). This is because F xΛ have a common unique
fixed point, viz., the unique fixed point q∗ of F x, and a common Liapunov function ‖q − q∗‖∞
applies. The a.s. boundedness argument argument of [27] (see also section 3.2 of [19]) applies
exactly as in these references except that one has to account for the t-dependence through Λ(t)
and the x-dependence. The argument uses the scaled limit of the (38) given by
q˙(t) = Fˆ xΛ(t)(q(t)) − q(t), (39)
where Fˆ xΛ(q) := limα↑∞
FxΛ(αq)
α
, which turns out to be of the same form as F xΛ(q) except that
the cost c˜() in (37) gets replaced by zero. Using arguments leading to Theorem 3.4 of [26], one
verifies that the origin is the globally asymptotically stable equilibrium of (39) uniformly in the
x variable2, which takes values in a compact set because c˜() is bounded, and Λ, as long as the
diagonal elements thereof are uniformly bounded away from zero. A minor adaptation of the
arguments of [27] (see also section 3.2 of [19]) yields the a.s. boundedness.
2This x-dependence is the only additional feature (or point of difference) here as compared to [26].
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• Step 2: Convergence of {Q˜n}:
As before, since γ1(n) = o(γ2(n)), we invoke the two time scale arguments of section 6.1, [19],
to treat both xn ≈ x and ǫn ≈ ǫ as frozen. The proof of a.s. boundedness and a.s. convergence
of {Q˜n} is exactly the same as in ‘Step 1’ above, i.e., as for Theorem 3.5 of [26] with only one
significant difference. The map F x above gets replaced by F˘ x where,
F˘ x(s,a1,a2)(q) := c˜(s, a
1, a2;x)− f(q)− q((s, a1), a2)+
∑
(s˜,a˜1)
p˜((s˜, a˜1)|(s, a1), a2)min
b
max
b′
q((s, b), b′).
The key property of F x used to prove Step 1 above is its non-expansivity with respect to the
‖ · ‖∞ norm. (See Lemma 3.1 of [26].) This property also holds for F˘
x, so the arguments remain
valid.
• Step 3: Convergence of {xn}:
From (23)-(24), it follows by arguments of Chapter 5, [19], (see also [12], [13]) that {xn} converges
a.s. to an internally chain transitive invariant set of (10). In view of the proof of Theorem 1,
this implies xn → D a.s.
• Step 4: Proof of optimality:
This follows from a standard fact about average cost MDPs recalled in the Appendix.
Remark 6. We can make a remark regarding convergence rate along the lines of the concluding remark
of section 3. The additional complication here is the multiple time scales, the error analysis for which
appears unavailable in literature. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the convergence/sample
complexity results be dictated by the slowest time scale which in this case is governed by the slowest
stepsize γ1(n) =
1
n+1 . Thus exactly the same observations as in the concluding remark of section
3 hold. There will be additional ‘tracking errors’ from the fast time scale iterations, but these will
remain within prescribed bounds with probability exceeding
1−O
(
e
− C
′
∑
∞
m=n0
γ2(m)
2
)
for n ≥ n0. Since γ1(n) = o(γ2(n)), this will be dominated by the error expression in (18), so the
latter continues to hold for the overall error.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a simple and computationally tractable strategy for approachability in Stackel-
berg stochastic games. We have also given a reinforcement learning based algorithm to learn the
approachable strategy when the transition kernels are unknown. The motivation for this came from
multi-objective optimization and decision making problems in a dynamically changing environment.
There are many interesting related questions that one can possibly address in the future. Extension
to stochastic games with discounted reward is one problem but the solution is possibly very messy
due to dependence on the initial state. Partial observations presents another challenge.
APPENDIX
Consider a controlled Markov chain {sn} with a finite state space S, compact metric action space
U with metric d, and running cost k(i, u), with transition probabilities p(j|i, u). Assume k, p to be
continuous in u. Also assume that Assumption 1 is true. The dynamic programming equation then is
V (i) = min
u
k(i, u) − κ+∑
j
p(j|i, u)V (j)
 , i ∈ S.
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Then κ is the optimal cost. Let U∗(i) denote the set of minimizers on the right hand side, which will
perforce be compact and nonempty by standard arguments. Suppose
d(an, U
∗(sn))→ 0.
Then we have
V (sn)− k(sn, an)− κ+ E[V (sn+1)|sn, an] → 0
=⇒ lim
n↑∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E[k(sm, am)]− κ = lim
n↑∞
1
n
(E[V (sn)]− E[V (s0)]) = 0.
Hence {an} is optimal.
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